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INTRODUCTION

In a previous article in this journal, one of the authors surveyed the long history of the
debate between proponents of the Arm’s Length Standard (“ALS”) and formulary
apportionment and suggested that perhaps this debate is more about semantics than
substance. 3 Specifically, the author suggested that in situations where comparables
could not be found, it may be advisable under the profit split method to use formulas
to allocate the residual profit left over after a standard rate of return is assigned to
2F
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routine functions, and that this is an acceptable use of formulary methods in an ALS
context.
This article tries to persuade tax policymakers that the formulary “demon” offers an
overall improvement to the current transfer pricing regime. It seeks to re-examine the
formulary alternative by inquiring whether partial integration of formulary concepts
into current practices would offer a reasonable alternative to transfer pricing rules.
It is not our intention to come up with a panacea of how to solve all the problems, or
even to come with a new proposal. Instead this article wishes to open a free-ofprejudice debate on how to best promote international tax policy, without sticking to
labels. It advances an outcomes based result to answer the key question of what is the
best way to achieve equitable and efficient allocation of MNE income.
As in the previous paper, we believe that the key to answering this question is to
resolve the problem of the residual, i.e., how to allocate income generated from
mobile assets and activities whose risks are born collectively by the entire MNE
group. This reflects our belief that these assets and activities generate most of current
transfer pricing compliance and administrative costs, as well as tax avoidance
opportunities. A limited formulary tax regime that allocates only the residual portion
of MNE income, may therefore offer significant advantages. Furthermore, such a
regime would not require significant deviation from current practices, or substantial
modifications in the international tax regime.
Part of the solution is to stop viewing the ALS and formulary arrangements as binary
alternatives. Instead of sticking to acronyms, policymakers need to embark on a long
journey of finding the middle path through small incremental trials and errors.
Ultimately, this journey will lead to a hybrid tax regime which incorporates elements
from both ALS (preferably, a tougher version of the CPM) for situations in which
good comparables exist and formulary arrangements for the hard-to-source residual
where there are no comparables.
This is not a utopian but rather a real world solution–a one that does not require full
cooperation among countries or reformulation of the entire international tax regime.
We believe that the OECD should take a leading role in this direction, as it has started
doing by accepting the profit-based methods as equal to the traditional ones under the
ALS.
I. WHY THE TRANSFER PRICING REGIME IS NOT WORKING AND CANNOT WORK
A. The Basics of Current Transfer Pricing Conventions 4
3F

Under the current tax system, multinational firms (both resident and non-resident) pay
tax to the U.S. government based on the income that they report earning in the United
States. As is typical, the United States employs a separate accounting system, under
which firms account for income and expenses in each country separately. The U.S.

4
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statutory corporate tax rate of 35%has been increasing relative to other OECD
countries over the previous 15 years.
As an example, consider a U.S. based multinational firm that operates a
subsidiary in Ireland. Assume that the U.S. corporate income tax rate is 35% while the
Irish corporate income tax rate is 12.5%. The Irish subsidiary earns €800 and decides
to repatriate €70 of the profits to the United States. (Assume, for ease of computation
only, a 1:1 exchange rate.) First, the Irish affiliate pays €100 to the Irish government
on profits of €800. It then repatriates $70 to the United States, using the remaining
profit (€630) to reinvest in its Irish operations. The firm must pay U.S. tax on the
repatriated income, but it is generally eligible for a tax credit of $100 (taxes paid)
times 70/700 (the ratio of dividends to after-tax profits), or $10. 5 Owing to deferral,
the remaining profits (€630) can grow abroad tax-free prior to repatriation.
This system creates a clear incentive to earn profits in low-tax countries. Firms
may respond by locating real activities (jobs, assets, production) in low-tax countries.
In addition, firms respond with various legal and accounting techniques to shift profits
to low-tax locations, disproportionately to the scale of business activities in such
locations. There are multiple such ways to shift income to subsidiaries in low-tax
countries. For example, it may be advantageous for multinational firms to alter the
debt/equity ratios of affiliated firms in high and low-tax countries in order to
maximize interest deductions in high-tax countries and taxable profits in low-tax
countries. Further, multinational firms have an incentive to distort the prices on intrafirm transactions in order to shift income to low-tax locations. For example, firms can
follow a strategy of under- (over-) pricing intra-firm exports (imports) to (from) lowtax countries, following the opposite strategy with respect to high-tax countries. The
most powerful of such techniques typically involve the transfer of interests in
intangible property, such as patents, copyrights and trademarks as well as unpatented
know-how, to subsidiaries in low-tax countries.
4F

B. Why It Is Broken—the Income Leakage and Compliance Cost of the Transfer
Pricing Regime
In theory, firms should be limited in their ability to engage in tax-motivated
transfer pricing by government enforcement of existing transfer pricing laws.
Governments generally require MNEs to price intrafirm transactions according to the
ALS—as if they were occurring with an unrelated party. At the heart of the ALS, is
the assumption that each affiliated company within the group transacts with the other
members of the group in the same way that it would transact if the members were
unrelated. That central assumption defies reality, and it is not surprising such a system
cannot yield sensible results.
The porosity of current transfer pricing rules creates an artificial tax incentive
to locate profits in low-tax countries, both by locating real economic activities in such
countries and by shifting profits for tax purposes toward more lightly taxed locations.
It is apparent that U.S. multinational firms book disproportionate amounts of profit in
low-tax locations. For example, Figure 1 shows the ten highest-profit locations for
U.S. multinational firms in 2005, based on the share of worldwide (non-U.S.) profits
5

. In general, under the U.S. tax system, when a non-U.S. subsidiary distributes income to a
U.S. parent through a dividend, the U.S. parent is entitled to a credit, against U.S. taxes for taxes paid
out of the distributed income to a foreign government.
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earned in each location. While some of the countries are places with a large U.S.
presence in terms of economic activity (the United Kingdom, Canada, Germany,
Japan), seven of the top-ten profit countries are locations with very low effective tax
rates.
Figure 1: Where Were the Profits in 2005?
(profits as a percentage of the worldwide total)
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Notes: In 2005, majority-owned affiliates of U.S. multinational firms earned $336 billion of
net income. This figure shows percentages of the worldwide (non-U.S.) total net income
occurring in each of the top-10 income countries. Thus, each percentage point translates into
approximately $3.4 billion of net income. Effective tax rates are calculated as foreign income
taxes paid relative to net (pre-tax) income. Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA) web page; 2005 is the most recent year with revised data available. The Bureau of
Economic Analysis conducts annual surveys of Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and
Their Foreign Affiliates.
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The literature has consistently found that multinational firms are sensitive to
corporate tax rate differences across countries in their financial decisions. Estimates
from the literature suggest that the tax base responds to changes in the corporate tax
rate with an average semi-elasticity of about -2; thus, countries with high corporate
tax rates are likely to gain revenue by lowering their tax rate. 6 One recent study
suggests that corporate income tax revenues in the United States were approximately
35% lower due to income shifting in 2004. 7Also, the literature suggests a substantial
responsiveness of real economic activities to tax rate differences among countries. 8
These findings imply both less activity in United States and less tax revenue for the
U.S. government. However, the tax responsiveness of real activity is less immediately
apparent in the data. For example, Figure 2 shows the top ten employment locations
for U.S. multinational firms in 2005, based on the share of worldwide (non-U.S.)
employment in each location. The high employment countries are the usual suspects –
large economies with close economic ties to the United States. As the accompanying
table indicates, tax rates are not particularly low for this set of countries.
5F

6F

7F

6

. See Ruud de Mooij and Sjef Ederveen, "Taxation and Foreign Direct Investment: A
Synthesis of Empirical Research," International Tax and Public Finance 10, no. 6, Nov. 2003, at 673693, and de Mooij, Ruud A. Will corporate income taxation survive? De Economist 153: 277-301
(2005) for an overview of this literature.
7
. This estimate is from Kimberly A. Clausing, Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and Tax
Policy, 62 NAT'L TAX J. 703, 721 (2009). The calculation is based on a regression of U.S.
multinational firm affiliate profit rates on tax rate differences across countries.
8
. See de Mooij and Ederveen, supra.
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Figure 2: Where Were the Jobs in 2005?
(employment as a percentage of the worldwide total)
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Notes: In 2005, majority-owned affiliates of U.S. multinational firms employed 9.1
million employees. This figure shows percentages of the worldwide (non-U.S.) total
employment occurring in each of the top-10 countries. Thus, each percentage point translates
into approximately 91,000 jobs. Effective tax rates are calculated as foreign income taxes paid
relative to net (pre-tax) income. Data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) web
page; 2005 is the most recent year with revised data available. The Bureau of Economic
Analysis conducts annual surveys of Operations of U.S. Parent Companies and Their Foreign
Affiliates.

Third, the current system is absurdly complex. As Taylor notes, observers
have described the system as “a cumbersome creation of stupefying complexity” with
“rules that lack coherence and often work at cross purposes.” 9 Altshuler notes that
observers testifying before the President’s Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform
8F

Taylor, Willard. 2005. Testimony before the President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform
(March 31). In Tax Notes (April 4; Doc 2005-6654).
http://www.taxreformpanel.gov/meetings/docs/willard.ppt#257,1, Presentation.9
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found the system “deeply, deeply flawed,” noting that “it is difficult to overstate the
crisis in the administration of the international tax system of the United States.” 10
Current transfer pricing rules have spawned a huge industry of lawyers, accountants
and economists whose professional role is to assist multinational companies in their
transfer pricing planning and compliance.
Finally, it is important to note that the problems with the current system derive
not from rules at its periphery, but instead from a fallacy that lies at the system’s
central core: namely, the belief that transactions among unrelated parties can be found
and that they can be used as meaningful benchmarks for tax compliance and
enforcement. 11
Such an approach might well have made sense eighty years ago, when the
legislative language underlying today’s arm’s length standard for income tax purposes
was first developed. 12 At that time, although multinational groups existed, available
transportation and communications technology did not permit close centralized
management of geographically dispersed groups. Therefore, members of
multinational groups functioned largely as independent entities, and benchmarking
their incomes or transactions based on uncontrolled comparables probably made good
sense.
That situation changed, however, with the technological changes precipitated
by the Second World War. Today, it is possible to exercise close managerial control
over multinational groups, and these groups develop in all industries and geographic
market segments in which the efficiencies of common control pose significant
economic advantages. Moreover, in those industries and markets where common
control poses advantages, it is typically economically infeasible to remain in the
market using a non-commonly controlled structure (for example, by maintaining
distributors that are economically independent of manufacturers). Therefore, in those
markets in which multinational groups operate – that is, in those markets in which
transfer pricing issues arise – it is unlikely that reasonably close “uncontrolled
comparables” can easily be found.
9F

10F

1F

Altshuler, Rosanne. 2005. International aspects of recommendations from the President's Advisory
Panel on Federal Tax Reform. Paper presented at Tax Reform in an Open Economy, Brookings
Institution, Washington, DC (December 2). http://www.brookings.edu/comm/events/20051202tax.pdf,
p. 12.10
11

. This argument is presented in detail in e.g., Reuven Avi-Yonah "The Rise and Fall of
Arm's Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation." Finance and Tax Law
Review 9:310 (updated version of article from 1995 Virginia Tax Rev. 15:80) (2006). See also,
e.g., Stanley I. Langbein "The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm's Length." Tax Notes
30:625 (1986), and Michael C. Durst & Robert E. Culbertson Clearing Away the Sand:
Retrospective Methods and Prospective Documentation in Transfer Pricing Today." Tax Law
Rev. 57. 37-84 (2003).
. For example, if one wants to determine the “arm’s length” level of profitability of a U.S.
distribution subsidiary of a foreign manufacturer of automobiles, one identifies one or more
independent U.S. distributors of automobiles operating in economically, similar circumstances and uses
the income of the independent distributor or distributors to benchmark the income of the U.S.
subsidiary.
12

. For historical summaries see, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Rise and Fall, supra; Langbein "The
Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm's Length", supra; Durst & Culbertson Clearing Away the
Sand", supra).
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This is true of virtually every other industry that is conducted on a large global
scale. In sum, no matter how assiduously one performs “functional analyses”
designed to identify “uncontrolled comparables” that are reasonably similar to
members of multinational groups, one is rarely going to find them. Certainly, such
comparables will not be – and have not been – found with sufficient regularity to
serve as the basis for a workable transfer pricing system. If the transfer pricing rules
are going to be made tolerably administrable, policymakers around the world will
need to restate them on a basis other than that of reliance on uncontrolled
comparables.
The results of the current system, which assumes the availability of useful
comparables in an economic environment where they are very unlikely to be found,
are predictable:
(i) Companies and the government spend extraordinary sums each year on
efforts at compliance and enforcement, largely through the preparation of
“contemporaneous documentation” 13 by taxpayers and attempts at comprehensive
examinations by the IRS involving some of the Service’s most experienced and
skilled personnel.
(ii) Despite the expense of compliance and enforcement, companies and the
IRS typically are dramatically far apart in their determinations of arm’s length
pricing. Controversies routinely involve hundreds of millions of dollars and are
resolved at amounts that resemble neither the government’s nor the taxpayer’s
positions, thereby casting grave doubt on the conceptual soundness of the underlying
rules. 14
(iii) The inability to predict whether their positions will be sustained leaves
companies and their investors with large areas of uncertainty in their financial
statements.
(iv) The absence of clear standards for compliance, coupled with the ability
under the arm’s length standard to apportion income to low-tax countries through
legal arrangements governing the sitting of intangibles and (more recently) the
bearing of risk, make it impossible for governments to predict with reasonable
accuracy their actual amount of corporate tax revenue. 15
12F

13F

14F

13

. See Treas. Reg. § 1.6662-6.
. A 1992 study by the General Accounting Office concluded that less than 30% of transfer
pricing adjustments proposed by IRS examiners ultimately were upheld in subsequent proceedings.
Similarly, in a recent multibillion dollar case settled out of court, the parties agreed on payment of 3.4
billion in settlement of pending transfer pricing claims; this represents concession of about 50% of the
deficiency before the Tax Court, although since the settlement covered years in addition to those then
pending before the court, the extent of IRS concession appears to have been larger. Overall, while
results vary from case to case, the IRS typically recovers at trial only a small proportion of transfer
pricing deficiencies that it has asserted. The lament by Judge Gerber in one case gives a good idea of
the atmosphere to be found in this field of law, despite attempts to project an image of statistical
science: “Once again, we are left stranded in a ‘sea of expertise’ and must navigate our own way
through a complex record to decide what constitutes an appropriate arm's-length consideration.” H
Group Holding, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 1999-334. The supply of very large, disputed transfer
pricing adjustments does not seem likely to be exhausted soon.
15
. In connection with the potential revenue implications of the proposed transfer pricing
reform, it is useful to consider the implications for transfer pricing reform proposals of the recently
increased accounting scrutiny of companies’ uncertain tax positions following the reforms of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and, especially, the Financial Accounting Standards Board’s Interpretation 48
(FIN 48). The new accounting rules probably reduce companies’ expectations of financial statement
benefit from taking what might be perceived as “aggressive” tax positions. Therefore, some of the
revenue gains that might otherwise be expected from the reform of transfer pricing rules (and from
some other possible tax reforms) might occur even in the absence of the reform. The recent accounting
14

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/art28

8

Avi-Yonah and Benshalom:

(v) The fact that neither taxpayers nor enforcement authorities typically have
clear standards for judging compliance means that issues involving very large
amounts – billions of dollars – of federal revenue are resolved in examination, settled
in Appeals, resolved in negotiations under tax treaties with foreign governments,
negotiated through advance pricing agreements, or settled by attorneys out-of-court
after examination. In most cases, federal privacy laws require that this decisionmaking occur outside the public eye. In the authors’ experience, those involved in this
process have served their roles with both integrity and skill. Nevertheless, the
resolution of issues involving such large amounts of money, without the benefit of
clearly discernable decision-making standards and public scrutiny, is not healthy for
the tax system.
(vi) A related problem is that the uncertain results under current transfer
pricing law degrade the quality of tax practice on the parts of both taxpayer and
government representatives, regardless of the high standards of practice that both
sides seek to maintain. Both sides are tempted to state, as “starting points” for what is
expected to be extended negotiation, positions that strain the edges of what most
would consider reasonable. The resulting atmosphere contributes to a lessening of the
publicly perceived credibility of both corporations and the government – a
development that is seriously damaging to what will always remain a largely mixed
economic system.

C. Why it cannot be Fixed—The Theoretical Deficiency of the Arm's Length Standard
This subpart explains why the current transfer pricing regime's underperformance is an inherent and inevitable byproduct of the ALS. Put differently, after
explaining why the current transfer pricing regime is not working, we turn to explain
why it cannot work.
To understand why the ALS imposes a structural limitation on the sourcing of
MNE income, it is important to examine how MNEs operate and why their business
model has become so prevalent and successful in the last two decades.
changes therefore complicate the task of estimate revenue effects from reforms such as that proposed in
this article.
The recent financial accounting changes, however, mitigate the problems of current transfer
pricing rules only to a limited extent. Although the accounting reforms might prevent some transactions
in which difficult issues may have arisen, or have altered the pricing that companies have chosen to
adopt in some circumstances, the reforms generally do not eliminate the uncertainty of current transfer
pricing rules but shift some of the burden of dealing with it to financial auditors. Moreover, much of
the portability of income to low- or zero-tax jurisdictions under the current rules does not depend on
positions that most would view as “aggressive,” but instead involve straightforward application of
today’s transfer pricing principles. Further, even if some arguably aggressive transactions or reporting
positions are eliminated, current transfer pricing rules will continue to impose administrative burdens
and uncertainties even with respect to entirely routine transactions with no hint of tax avoidance intent.
Thus, while the new accounting rules pose many benefits, including imposing some restraints on
transactions arguably involving “aggressive” transfer pricing planning, they leave substantial need for
reform of the transfer pricing tax rules themselves.
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MNEs flourish in those industries where the ability to integrate functions in
different jurisdictions enables them to reduce certain costs through synergy that takes
advantage of economics of scope and scale. These costs include research and
development costs, transaction costs, information-obtaining costs, managerial costs,
and finance costs. 16 The ability to efficiently internalize these costs is the essence of
the MNE structure—and an important source of profitability. All MNE entities which
are somehow involved with the activity that produces the benefits participate in some
ways in this cost reduction process. It is the MNE's multi-jurisdictional nature that
enables the reduction of these costs—rather than its activity in any specific
jurisdiction. Hence the ALS cannot break down the cost of what unrelated parties
would have done—because the MNE setting is designed precisely to save the costs of
doing business through unrelated transactions.
As the above subpart describes, this theoretical deficiency translates to a real
enforcement deficit. Tax authorities require MNEs to report their income in a way that
breaks down the cost saving associated with being a MNE on an ALS basis. This
requirement cannot be met, verified, or consistently enforced. 17 This inherent
vagueness motivates MNEs to structure their affairs in a way that reduces their tax
costs. To the extent that intra-group transactions are relatively inexpensive, MNEs try
to shift their income to low-tax jurisdictions and their deductions to high-tax
jurisdictions.
Tax authorities have responded to this deficiency with burdensome and
rigorous transfer pricing rules—which, among other things, impose high
documentation standards that require MNEs to reveal their intra-group pricing
methods. While these requirements limit MNEs' abilities to shift income, this Pyrrhic
victory has come only at the tremendous costs associated with compliance,
administration, and litigation. These requirements cannot change tax authorities’
inherent disadvantaged position in transfer pricing controversies that involve
sophisticated MNE taxpayers. MNEs enjoy superior information about their own
activities and can devote more resources to tax planning. Furthermore, in a world
characterized by an accelerating growth in international commerce and MNEs, it is
highly questionable whether tax authorities can effectively scrutinize the volume of
affiliated contractual transactions.
This gave rise to a dynamic in which tax authorities add layers of complexity
to ALS transfer pricing enforcement to prevent avoidance. Perhaps paradoxically, tax
authorities have found themselves dependent on ALS rules, but at the same time
unable to consistently and effectively apply them. However, as the layers of transfer
15F

16F

16

For example, while it may be very costly to develop informational assets (such as the design of a
production line), once they are developed, this information could be costlessly distributed and utilized
in various locations. Hence, a high-tech company like Motorola can develop a production line in
Britain, which would later be used by a subsidiary in Indonesia. The ability to transfer this knowledge
in a cheap and reliable way, allows Motorola to pursue the comparative advantages of both the British
and Indonesian labor markets. This source of Motorola's profit is a result of its multi-jurisdictional
nature and cannot be exclusively attributed to Britain, Indonesia, or any other jurisdiction. Another
example involves a company like Coca-Cola, who needs to invest many resources in building its brand
name. This requires investing in high profile commercials (e.g., those involving famous movie stars)
and promotion activities (e.g., sponsoring the Olympic games). The benefit of these activities obviously
involves an economy of scale since while their fixed costs of production are huge, the same
commercial can be used in many jurisdictions, and the benefits of sponsoring an international sporting
event such as the Olympics is not limited to one jurisdiction.
17
Testimony of Hon. Stephen E. Shay, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy (International), US
Department of the Treasury, US House Ways and Means Committee, July 22, 2010.
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pricing regulations continue to accumulate, tax authorities’ commitment to the ALS
seems as entrenched as ever.

II. DISTINGUISHING THE FORMULARY ALTERNATIVE FROM A UNITARY REGIME
Over the years, tax specialists have referred to the unitary system as the major
alternative to the ALS-based transfer pricing regime. Unitary systems are typically
used as a way to allocate the corporate tax base between states in federations (e.g.,
Canada and the United States).
Under a unitary regime, MNEs file a consolidated report with respect to their
entire earnings—effectively disregarding intra-group transactions. The consolidated
net (positive or negative) income figure is then allocated among the various
jurisdictions in which MNEs operate via an apportionment formula. The formula is
typically comprised of easy-to-observe factors that indicate the economic activity in
the jurisdiction (e.g., sales, payroll expenses, and assets). The formula allocates the
income to each jurisdiction according to the relative weight of its indicators.
This allocation formula represents a policy choice to allocate income by
approximation—rather than an attempt to precisely determine how MNE income is
generated. Since there is no one metric that explains the opaque process through
which MNEs generate profits, the choice of formula factors, their measurement, and
the relative weight—are not precise indicators of MNE economic activity. Instead,
they operate as a crude averaging mechanism that allocates MNE income while
disregarding the distinctive circumstances of MNE investments in different
jurisdictions.
Although the unitary system requires an allocation formula, the two terms are
not equivalent and should be analytically distinguished. Formulary allocation refers
solely to allocating income through an allocation formula—instead of trying to
determine the market price of the relevant affiliated transactions that produced the
income. The unitary concept also tries to consolidate all MNE income sources, which
is advantageous for corporations because it allows them to consolidate their losses
from different jurisdictions.
Unlike the unitary regime, formulary sourcing could be applied to some
sources of MNE income. It therefore requires distinguishing these sources of income
from other sources, but does not depend on the ability to consolidate the income of the
entire MNE group. Put differently, even though a consolidated unitary setting requires
an allocation formula—allocation formulas could be used also in other settings. The
formulary tool does not require an ambitious (unitary) MNE income consolidation
process and does not offer corporations the benefits of comprehensive loss
consolidation. Instead, formulary allocation could be applied toward specific sources
of MNE income.

III. INTEGRATING FORMULARY SOLUTIONS TO IMPROVE CURRENT TAX
ARRANGEMENTS
This paper argues that formulary, rather than unitary, arrangements can be
utilized to advance the objectives of the international tax regime. This middle path
approach has been overlooked, even though it adopting it would not require a
reformulation of the international tax regime. In previous papers, we have explained
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how specific formulary and unitary solutions should be implemented. Instead of
advocating for a specific solution, this paper outlines general considerations for why
policymakers should consider integrating formulary arrangements into current tax
practices. It explains why, despite its many difficulties, this integration is realistic and
would be superior to the current ALS-base transfer pricing regime.
Critics of the unitary alternative assume that imposing it in a worldwide
setting would be unrealistic due to insufficient global economic and political
integration. However, even if we assume that the unitary alternative is indeed
utopian, this does not mean that formulary allocation should not be used. While the
unitary option may indeed be too difficult to implement, it may still be wise to
examine whether formulary arrangements could better allocate certain sources of
MNE income—especially in those areas where ALS transfer-pricing rules seem to be
inadequate.
This analysis emphasizes two main themes: First, ALS and formulary methods
are not mutually exclusive. Instead, each of these two methods has its own set of
strengths and weaknesses—which could be combined and reconciled into an
integrated regime. This system we suggest would continue to employ ALS allocation
to transactions where there is an easily observable and consistent market price/rate-ofreturn to a certain commodity/commercial-activity. At the same time, this system
would use formulary arrangements for those hard-to-allocate MNE sources of income.
A binary distinction between the formulary alternatives is unjustified and
counterproductive as it helps perpetuate the status quo, which benefits MNEs, tax
planners, and low-tax haven jurisdictions.
Second, although not free of problems, a hybrid formulary-ALS regime does
not have to be perfect. Perfect solutions are hard to come by, which makes
contemplating and waiting for them an extremely unattractive policy trajectory.
Instead, the costs of any future regime should be measured against those of the current
regime. Wise policymaking should aim to realistically reduce rather than completely
eliminate the problems and social costs associated with current MNE allocation
arrangements.
This Part identifies six arguments that are prevalent in the international tax
policy discourse with respect to formulary apportionment of MNEs’ income. Each of
these arguments stresses why policymakers should not use formulary arrangements to
allocate MNE income. This paper labels these arguments "myths" and explains that,
even taken together, the costs suggested by these arguments do not outweigh the
potential benefits of a hybrid formulary-ALS MNE allocation regime. We conclude
that it would be beneficial for tax authorities and the OECD to examine how to
(cautiously and gradually) shift to such a hybrid regime.

Myth #1: The Formulary Apportionment cannot Replace the Arm's Length Standard
because it is Arbitrary
The Myth:
U

Any formulary allocation is, at the end of the day, merely a crude
approximation of where MNE economic activity is taking place. The underlying
assumption behind the formulary regime is that the location of formulary factors—
such as sales, payroll and assets—mimics the way MNEs generate profits. Hence it
assumes that MNEs yield the same average rate of return on their assets, employees,
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and sale activities. This assumption is evidently wrong, and the arbitrariness of
relying upon it prohibits tax authorities from shifting from an ALS to a formulary
regime because source taxes should be levied in the jurisdictions where they are
actually generated.
The Prospect:
U

Formulary allocation is indeed merely an approximation which cannot
penetrate the MNE profit-generating process. However, from a theoretical
perspective, formulary alternatives are as arbitrary as the ALS. From a revenuegenerating perspective, formulary arrangements are probably less arbitrary—because
they are less susceptible to manipulation by intra-MNE contractual arrangements.
Theoretically, the ALS relies on fiction because it dictates a sourcing method
that is insensitive to any specific intra-group pricing method MNEs actually have. The
ALS uses market comparables to source income according to the most prevalent
market transactions and not according to how the MNE really operates. For example,
assume three different oil companies whose costs of extracting refining and shipping
oil products differ. The companies are each able to derive excessive profits: one by
attaining lucrative licenses from various governments, another by developing special
deep-ocean-drilling technologies, and the third by successfully foreseeing trends in oil
and shipping prices. Even though their sources of profit differ, under a transferpricing regime the intra-group transactions of the three MNEs would be priced
similarly because market-price benchmarks are available for all oil products. Hence,
where it is easy to observe the price of various products, the ALS provides a
reasonable sourcing method because it is fixed and therefore efficient—and not
because it is correct. As in the case of any presumptive tax, the fixed nature of the
ALS provides an incentive to all three oil companies to conduct their operation in the
most efficient manner because they cannot avoid the tax.
While the theoretical arbitrariness of the ALS is not by itself a problem, it is
important to stress that two conditions have to be fulfilled for it to operate as a good
proxy. First, tax authorities should have a comprehensive taxonomy and pricing
schedule of the relevant market transactions. Second, geographical and legal partitions
within the MNE should reflect some type of economic and operational distinction.
Today, these two conditions are far from being fulfilled because MNEs derive much
of their profits from functional integration, which allows them to increase the benefits
precisely in those fields where there are no good markets. This means that a great deal
of MNE profitability is derived from unique intra-MNE transactions (e.g., the use of
intangibles, the rendering of managerial services). With respect to these transactions,
MNEs have to come up with significant amount of paperwork to justify their pricing
even though many of these transactions could not have taken place between unrelated
parties. Therefore, from a tax administration perspective, the ALS is a futile and
inadequate proxy to allocate the income of these transactions.
Obviously, in those cases where the tax savings are substantial, and the costs
of intra-group transactions are (relatively) cheap, MNEs have the incentive to use
ALS arbitrariness to shift income to low-tax jurisdictions. Hence, from a revenue
raising perspective, it is very arbitrary to allow MNEs to determine their tax allocation
through intra-group contracts. An allocation formula that is based on relatively
immobile, difficult-to-manipulate, and easy-to-observe indicators of economic
activity would provide a much less arbitrary stream of revenues.
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This inaptness of the ALS is also (de facto) recognized by tax authorities, who
increasingly rely on profit-split methods to price affiliated transactions with no good
market comparables. Instead of trying to hypothesize how unrelated parties would
price the transaction, profit split methods aggregate the income generated from them
and divide it according to each subsidiary's contribution. This vague notion of
contribution is essentially a quasi-formulary approach. Rather than trying to
determine price elasticities of various functions that each subsidiary preformed, it
determines the allocation of income by the relative volume of activity taken in each
jurisdiction. Hence, although profit-split methods are considered part of the ALSbased transfer pricing rules, tax authorities’ increasing reliance on them signals that
they recognize the limitedness of ALS-based rules.
Myth #2: Formulary Apportionment would Require a Comprehensive International
Corporate Tax Base
The Myth:
U

Of all the various fields of economic regulation, direct taxation of businesses
is probably the field in which nations are least able to coordinate and harmonize their
rules. While all tax regimes are devastatingly complex, each country seems to attach a
lot of value to its own form of complexity. In this state of affairs, trying to implement
any formulary regime would be a Sisyphean task. Every formulary arrangement
requires some measurement of the income that would be allocated by the formula.
Given the low record of international tax harmonization, there is little reason to
believe that corporate income would be measured similarly by different countries.
The Prospect:
U

This paper's main claim is that formulary arrangement should not allocate all
MNE income but only those sources of income where the ALS is inadequate. The
proposed regime would therefore be comprised of both ALS and formulary
sourcing—with the latter applied only to a subset of MNE income. This subset would
be comprised of those sources of MNE income that could not be sourced according to
the ALS.
We agree that any attempt to form a comprehensive corporate tax base in the
near future suffers from high failure probabilities. 18 We further agree that it would be
unfeasible to establish any international sourcing unitary regime that requires the
measurement of the MNE’s entire income. However, unlike unitary arrangements,
formulary arrangements offer a different (much more limited) alternative. Formulary
sourcing regimes could be applied only to a subset of MNE income and not to a
consolidated income figure of the entire group of MNE subsidiaries.
This paper refers to the sources of income that should be taxed by formulary
arrangements as the residual. This residual should be comprised of those income17F

18

Most indicative is the ongoing (and one could say everlasting) EU attempt to form such a tax base as
part of the CCCTB initiative. Member States, which have an impressive record of harmonizing their
trade and monetary policies, find it difficult to agree upon the features of such a tax base. This
difficulty is striking because the CCCTB is planned to be optional, so that European Member States
and MNEs can subscribe to it but would not have to. See on this issue Ilan Benshalom, A
Comprehensive Solution for a Targeted Problem: A Critique of the Eu's Home State Taxation and
Ccctb Initiatives, 48 Eur. Tax’n 630 (2009)
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generating activities that could not be easily sourced by the ALS because there is no
adequate benchmark to which they could be compared. This residual category would
be primarily comprised of income derived from mobile intangible and financial assets.
The key problem is that the intra-group ownership of these assets is tax elastic
because MNEs' direct costs of moving them to different subsidiaries are low.
Moreover, the indirect costs of holding these assets in low-tax jurisdictions may also
be low because the economic benefit of owning them is not limited to the subsidiary
that owns them. For example, financial assets stored in a foreign subsidiary could be
re-invested by it either in intra-group enterprises or in other interest-bearing financial
assets. Furthermore, a parent company can borrow against the financial assets of its
subsidiary and thus lower its interest rate. For a low-tax jurisdiction to be attractive, it
should also have stable business-friendly political and economic-regulatory
environments. However, there are many low-tax jurisdictions that have these features,
and MNEs achieve low costs and low risks by owning assets through subsidiaries
located in them.
Intangible assets present one example of income-generating activity that
cannot be easily sourced by the ALS. They are characterized by high fixed and low
marginal costs of production and could be owned anywhere because they have no
fiscal presence. As part of the shift of developed countries to a post-industrial
economy, intangible assets comprise an ever-growing share of MNEs' assets and are
becoming more complex, diversified, and unique. Hence, it could be difficult to price
these assets and the services rendered to create them. For example, if a MNE
subsidiary located in a low-tax jurisdiction owns an intangible asset, all the entities in
the MNE group could use it (in return for royalties). Intangibles can be anything—
rights for exclusivity, patents, trade names—and they could be transferred to a
corporate entity in a low-tax jurisdiction before they are operational so that it bears
the risk of their failure. A MNE can capitalize a low-tax subsidiary and make sure that
it contracts with other subsidiaries to undertake most of the process of developing the
intangible. While those subsidiaries would be compensated for their services—under
an ALS transfer pricing regime, the low-tax subsidiary would be compensated for the
risk it undertakes. Since much of intangibles' value is not known at the time of their
development, this compensation for risk may be substantial. In a non-ALS, morecommon-sense world, one might wonder what component of the risk would be
actually borne by the subsidiary in the low-tax jurisdiction. The ownership of the
intangible, its finance, and the risk associated with it are all conducted by the same
MNE—which makes the process of assigning ownership to one subsidiary rather
obscure. Assigning the ownership of the intangible to the low-tax subsidiary looks
more like a shift of assets from one pocket to another, and there seems to be no real
meaning to the intra-group contractual allocation of risk. What unrelated parties
would have done seems irrelevant—because unrelated parties would have to really
bear the risk themselves if the development of the intangible fails.
Furthermore, to best utilize intangible assets MNEs adopt a horizontally
integrated business model in which intangibles are simultaneously created and utilized
by different MNE entities. This functional integration often means that the risks and
interests borne by the different MNE collides so that breaking up their value between
MNE subsidiaries in accordance with the ALS is simply meaningless.
In the case of financial transactions, the problem of pricing is not as acute as in
the case of intangibles—pricing the "proper" related-party interest rate is a feasible
task for most tax authorities. However, tax authorities do not have the analytical or
enforcement tools to determine whether a debt form of the intra-group investment
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transaction is itself proper. This inability introduces a huge tax enforcement problem
given the many alternative ways that MNEs can mobilize and repackage their
commonly controlled pool of fungible capital assets and liabilities. Because money is
a fungible commodity, the internal capital structure of a MNE is tax elastic, which
means that taxpayers can use economically equivalent but legally different
transactions to finance their activities. By categorizing the intra-group financial
transaction in a tax-efficient way, MNEs can skew the risks associated with relatedparty financing to low-tax jurisdictions. Under the ALS, these risks would have to be
compensated for. Hence, even though it could widely be assumed that affiliated
lending and borrowing involves much less credit risk than unrelated transactions, the
ALS requires tax authorities to price their interest rate as if made between unrelated
parties.
MNEs enjoy the ability to assign the ownership and leasing rights over their
mobile assets to the various entities in the different jurisdictions in which they
operate. The inaptness of the ALS basis means therefore that MNEs are able to use
their contractual freedom to shift income and thereby avoid taxes on income arising
from those mobile assets. Furthermore, it means that MNEs are able to use the
internal dealing of financial and intangible resources to strip the income from tangible
activities that are conducted in entities located in high-tax jurisdictions. 19
Instead of this convoluted system, this paper suggests a hybrid regime—where
the residual income is taxed on a formulary basis while other (perhaps the majority) of
MNE activities are taxed by the ALS. MNEs will find it considerably more difficult to
shift income in those cases where there is a clear, easily observable, and consistently
priced market benchmark. Hence, tax authorities should continue to apply ALS-based
rules—because they offer a fixed (and therefore efficient), easily monitored and
enforced proxy to the location where profits are generated. While comparable price
mechanisms could still be used, we have a strong preference for (fixed and inflexible)
comparative profit methods (CPMs)—which assume a certain rate of return for a
given activity. The main benefit of such CPMs is that they limit MNEs' ability to shift
income via intra-group contractual risk allocations. 20 The residual income—where
there is no adequate market comparable—should be taxed by formulary arrangements.
There is no one correct formula—and, indeed, different portions of the
residual may be sourced by different formulary arrangements. Each formulary
arrangement should try to provide a crude yet sensible proxy to the location of the
income-generating activities associated with the relevant source of income it seeks to
allocate. For example, a plausible formulary arrangement in the case of intangibles
would try to allocate the income attributed to intangibles to those locations where they
have been generated and/or where they are utilized. 21 A formulary arrangement of the
18F

19F

20F

19

For example, since MNEs are able to manage their own internal financial structures, they aim to do
so in the way that allows them the most favorable (after tax) result. This prescribes that they would take
advantage of interest payments' deductibility and the low source-withholding taxes on interest, to
finance their activities in high-tax jurisdictions through related-party debt. See detailed explanation in
Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Interest Income: Stages in the Development of International
Taxation, 27 Va. Tax Rev. 631 (2008)
20
For example, distribution and manufacturing services would be allocated a certain percentage of the
overall sales. See Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing The "Unsourceable": The Cost Sharing Regulations and
the Sourcing of Affiliated-Intangible Related Transactions, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 631 (2007)
21
See Id. at . This article provides a distinction between production based (R&D) intangibles that
should be allocated to the places where they have been generated, and passive intangibles—where there
is no economic significance to the place where they have been created but only to where they are
utilized. The article also provides some sourcing solutions for complex intangibles
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income derived from financial assets would recognize that financial assets and
obligations are owned by the MNE group as a whole. This prescribes that financial
income should be allocated among jurisdictions based on the relative amount of MNE
assets and activities located in them. 22 This paper focuses on advancing the notion
that once MNE residual income would not be allocated on an ALS basis, many of the
problems of the current transfer pricing regime would be significantly reduced. This
would allow the ALS to become the effective enforcement tool it was originally
intended to be—a credible, efficient, and easily administered benchmark for
allocating MNE income.
The hybrid regime would not be free of problems as it would still involve
distinguishing the residual income from the income generated through other activities
and measuring it. However, tax authorities face the same difficulties under the current
regime. Hence, although many aspects of MNE sourcing are bound to be determined
by fact-specific valuation inquiries, a hybrid regime could deal more adequately with
the problem of shifting. At the very minimum, MNE sourcing arrangements should
seek to detach issues concerned with the economic ownership of mobile assets from
questions of valuating how much income the MNEs generate from them. As they do
now, tax authorities and MNEs would have to resolve the questions of whether a
certain source of income is part of the residual and to value the net income derived
from a certain asset or activity. However, once these questions are resolved, a hybrid
regime would relieve tax authorities (and MNEs) from the burden of hypothesizing
what unrelated parties would do to allocate the benefits of complicated and MNEunique transactions.
21F

Myth #3: Formulary Apportionment is Impossible because it would be Insensitive and
therefore Disruptive) to actual Business Practices
The Myth:
U

The common denominator of all formulary arrangements is the contention that
intra-group related transactions should be disregarded. This notion is inconsistent with
how MNE subsidiaries do business with each other. In a business reality where legal
ownership and classification have important economic consequences—arguing that
intra-MNE transactions should be disregarded will result in inaccurate measurement
of MNE income. For example, debt investment is different from equity investment (in
terms of insolvency priority), the legal ownership of intellectual property would
determine the regulatory regime it is subject to, and certain subsidiaries may have
regulatory restrictions on the risks that they can undertake. Disregarding all these
attributes would be intellectually wrong but would also disrupt the manner in which
MNEs do business. Furthermore, consider a MNE engaged in a massive (and overall
profitable) international R&D project that involves subsidiaries in many jurisdictions.
22

Therefore, a possible formulary arrangement of financial assets and risks would disregard the tax
consequences of affiliated MNE transactions altogether. This prescribes that the net taxable financial
income of MNEs should be determined through financial transaction with unrelated parties. This net
taxable financial income figure would be allocated via a formula that would take into account tangible
asset payroll and the total amount of sales in different jurisdictions. See Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to
Tax Financial Income in a Global Economy: Emerging to an Allocation Phase – Taxing Global
Financial Institutions, 28 Va. Tax Rev. 165 (2008); Ilan Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of
Multinational Enterprises by Employing a Formulary Arm’s Length Allocation Mechanism, 28 Va. Tax
Rev. 631 (2009).
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One of these subsidiaries, which is in charge of one potential application of the
intangible, has an inadequate business model and labor force. As a result, this
subsidiary inflicts massive costs on the entire project. Under a formulary arrangement,
the actual performance of the subsidiary would be disregarded and it would receive a
(positive) share of the net income generated by the intangible. This result is
counterintuitive and incorrect because it would allocate tax revenues to a tax
jurisdiction which did not have any real contribution to the MNE income generating
process.
The Prospect:
U

The argument that formulary arrangements are insensitive to business
practices should be analytically distinguished from the argument that these
arrangements would disrupt such practices. There are three different arguments for
why the alleged insensitivity of formulary arrangements would not result in major
disruptions to current business practices. First, formulary apportionment only
disregards intra-MNE transactions for tax purposes. This disregard would not spill
over to other legal regimes, so many of the non-tax motivated business practices will
continue to take place. Second, business practices are not engraved in stone but are
responsive to the tax-regulatory environments in which they operate. Some
contemporary business practices have been negatively impacted by the ALS over the
years—so a shift to a hybrid regime may actually reduce the disruption of MNEs’
efficient allocation of resources. Finally, formulary arrangements are averaging
mechanisms that rely upon fixed indicators that cannot be nuanced to every aspect of
MNEs' operation. However, fixed and crude sourcing arrangements are likely to be
more efficient and (may be) more equitable if their overall result proxies the
economic reality of where MNEs operate. Furthermore, formulary arrangements can
be subject to certain (limited) exceptions, which would provide the hybrid regime
with flexibility.
This subpart elaborates upon the above arguments in the order presented. First,
the tax treatment of intra-MNE related transactions does not undermine MNEs
freedom of contract or deny them the flexibility to arrange their intra-group
contractual affairs as they see fit. While MNEs enjoy the right to arrange their
financial and assets-ownership structures, they do not have a right to freely determine
their tax liability through those transactions. More specifically, while MNEs should
have the right to move their financial and intangible assets to subsidiaries located in
offshore financial tax havens like Bermuda, they have no enshrined right that this
transfer would be taxed on an ALS basis. Hence, if MNEs have certain legitimate
business advantages for moving assets to low-tax jurisdictions, the formulary tax
arrangement disregards the tax consequences of the transfer but does not deny the
MNEs any of the non-tax advantages. It does aim to limit the tax advantages
associated with such asset shifting, which essentially do not reflect any real tangible
business activity or risk taking by the MNE.
Second, ALS indeed tries to mimic certain business practices, but the situation
is more dynamic because current business practices are also, partly, shaped by ALS
sourcing arrangements. The ALS was adopted between the two World Wars because
it was consistent with the business reality of that era. In the brick and mortar industrial
economy of the first half of the twentieth century, there was often a functional
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distinction between subsidiaries which aligned with corporate and national borders. 23
Today, MNEs integrate many of their cross-border functions. For example, many
high-tech MNEs such as Microsoft have the same intangible assets being developed in
multiple R&D centers around the world. These centers share sensitive information
and communicate daily through thousands of e-mails, telephone calls, and video
conferences. This integrated and interdependent production model would not be
possible with unrelated parties, so that arguing that the revenues generated from it
should be allocated on an ALS-basis seems obsolete. Hence, to the extent that ALS
aligns with cross-border, functionally integrated business practices, it is because the
latter have adjusted so that MNEs can "translate" their practice to fit ALS taxaccounting conventions.
This point could be taken a bit further—suggesting that MNEs have some
interest in shifting to a hybrid regime. While they obviously wish to maintain their
income-shifting privileges under the existing regime, the current transfer-pricing
system is costly for them as well. Having to come up with a case-by-case pricing
methodology supported by documentation and the need to prepare for lengthy tax
audits and tax-controversy proceedings consumes a considerable amount of financial
and managerial time-resources. Additionally, there may be some non-tax cost to
income shifting. This means that income-shifting of mobile assets may result in
inefficient allocation of resources—despite the fact that it reduces the overall (tax and
non-tax) costs of the MNE. Hence, when contemplating the political price necessary
to get MNEs on board, policymakers should bear in mind that a hybrid regime would
benefit them in certain respects as well.
Third, formulary arrangements are indeed a one-size-fits-all alternative to the
ALS transfer pricing rule. 24 The main strength of the formulary mechanism is that it
relies on (relatively) simple income-averaging and allocation rules. Simplicity,
however, is not a free good, and in the world of tax administration simplicity typically
comes as a tradeoff to flexibility and accuracy. Formulary arrangements should
therefore be designed so that they allocate income in a way that (roughly) reflects the
level of MNE economic activity in a specific jurisdiction. They cannot (and should
not) be designed to accommodate any specific MNE business model or situation. The
formulary arrangement should be structured to cover the vast majority of cases. This
would greatly reduce compliance and administrative costs, and would result in a more
transparent and equally applied MNE tax allocation regime. 25 Since tax authorities
already rely on these ad hoc formulary arrangements, 26 they have much to gain and
little to lose by making this explicit and shifting to more structured formulary
arrangements.
2F

23F

24F

25F

23

Hence, when the income tax was first imposed, it made a lot of sense to employ the ALS—which
mimicked how cross border transactions really occurred. However, the economy has radically changed
over the last eighty years as communication and transportation technologies have developed and as
political and regulatory constraints have been gradually removed. This, inevitably, has also changed
how MNEs operate. Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Interest Income: Stages in the Development of
International Taxation, 27 Va. Tax Rev. 631 (2008)
24
There may be different formulary arrangements for different type of activities or income sources
(see supra note 21-22 for references to such formulary arrangements). The one-size-fits-all means that
these formulary arrangement are fixed so that taxpayers have no ability to elect which one they would
be subject to.
25
Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst, supra.
26
As mentioned, tax authorities have, in many cases, already abandoned traditional ALS in favor of
profit-split income allocation methods. Even though these methods use quasi-formulary principles, they
still have to be implemented on a case-by-case basis. This means that they still extract considerable
compliance and audit resources. Furthermore, MNEs still control when and how to use those methods.

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2010

19

Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 28 [2010]

Admittedly, there may be cases where the formulary arrangement reaches
counterintuitive results or is just too costly to implement. However, there are ways to
deal with these cases without losing the overall advantages associated with the hybrid
regime. First, the formulary component in the hybrid regime should be designed as a
default rule. Like the Advance Pricing Agreement (APA) process today, 27 MNEs with
unique business models and/or unique circumstances, would be able to enter into
special tax-sourcing agreements with tax authorities. Today the baseline for those
negotiations is the ALS transfer-pricing regime, in which MNEs have an advantage
over tax authorities when there are no clear market benchmarks. 28 In contrast, under a
hybrid formulary-ALS regime, tax authorities would have a much better opening
bargaining position. Whenever there is no clear market benchmark, MNEs would
have to allocate the taxes by a formula that is based on easy-to-observe and difficultto-manipulate factors. Second, while most large MNEs probably have a significant
residual component, small-to-medium MNEs' residual income may be relatively
small. Other (perhaps even relatively large) MNEs may have a small residual income
component. Since those MNEs would still be required to use the ALS standard,
imposing a formulary arrangement on them would increase their compliance costs
significantly without providing any significant revenue advantages to tax authorities.
Therefore, a certain de minimis rule should be applied so that formulary arrangements
would not be imposed when the costs of introducing it seem very high in comparison
to its benefits.
26F

27F

Myth #4: It would be Easy to Tax-Plan Against Formulary Arrangements *
28F

The Myth:
Formulary arrangements assume that there are easy-to-observe and hard-tomanipulate indicators of economic activity. However, once the formulary factors are
spelled out, MNEs would change their behavior so that as much as possible of their
taxable income would be allocated to low-tax jurisdictions. MNEs can manipulate the
form of their transactions—e.g., if payroll is a factor, then MNEs would engage in
direct hiring in low-tax jurisdictions and outsource functions in high-tax jurisdictions.
If the location of sales is taken into account by the formula, then MNEs would finalize
their sales in tax havens.
U

The Prospect:
The identification of formulary factors obviously provides taxpayers with the
incentive to manipulate the indicators to minimize their tax liabilities. The question is
not whether MNEs would have these incentives under a hybrid allocation regime, but
the extent to which they are likely to respond to these incentives. This subpart outlines
why MNEs’ incentives to manipulate formulary factors would not be detrimental to
the functioning of the hybrid regime.
The question of the tax elasticity of MNEs' behavior with respect to formulary
factors is empirical and therefore difficult to answer given our limited experience with
U

27

Diane M. Ring, On the Frontier of Procedural Innovation: Advanced Pricing Agreements and the
Struggle to Allocate Income for Cross-Border Taxation, 21 Mich. J.of Int. Law 143 (2000)
28
Namely their ability to drag tax authorities into long fact intensive audit controversies where they the
MNEs have superior information.
*
This myth relates only to the problem of tax induced manipulation and not to with the shifting of real
economic activity offshore—an issue dealt with in Myth #6.
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formulary and unitary arrangements in the international arena. 29 Our first observation
is that MNEs are not likely to engage in manipulation if it is costly and the tax
rewards to it are low. One attribute that minimizes the rewards for manipulation under
a hybrid regime is that the formulary arrangement would apply only to the residual
income. This means that, unlike the unitary regime, the rewards for manipulating the
allocation formula in a hybrid regime would be considerably lower—because only a
subset of the MNE income could be diverted. A second attribute relates to the number
of factors. If the formula has many factors, MNEs would find it difficult to gain big
tax advantages by manipulating any one of them. A third attribute relates to the nontax costs which manipulating a certain factor would entail. If there are real non-tax
costs associated with moving the factor, the likelihood that MNEs would engage in
aggressive manipulation is low.
The key is therefore to come up with enough difficult-to-manipulate and easyto-observe factors that would provide an indication to the level of MNE economic
activity in a specific jurisdiction. For example, the following factors seem to satisfy
this requirement: retail sales and services (by the country of the purchaser), overall
sales in a given jurisdiction (including sales made by agents), movable assets, real
estate assets, value of leases, payroll of direct employees, payroll of outside
contractors that work more than twenty hours per week in the MNE premises, etc. 30
There is no magic set of factors—and their choice should be a complicated
process of trial and error. For example, if tax authorities find that MNEs can easily
manipulate the location of business-to-business sales, then they should avoid using
this factor and replace it with a more difficult-to-manipulate factor such as retail
sales. 31 Additionally, assets should be attributed to the location where they are
employed and not where they are used because MNEs can easily shift the legal
ownership of assets. The location of inventories and intangible assets is mobile and
tax sensitive in many cases so that their value of these assets should be significantly
discounted (inventories), or omitted altogether for formulary purposes (intangibles). 32
The payroll factor reflects the human capital MNEs employ in a given jurisdiction,
which is (relatively) easy to observe and difficult to shift (because employees are
difficult to move). 33
29 F

30F
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Most unitary arrangements are applied in federative nations to allocate the state corporate tax base. It
is difficult to conclude from the intra-nation example because the effective corporate tax rate on the
state level tends to be low. In the United States, for example, rates are typically below 10% and state
tax liabilities are deductable from the federal tax liability of corporations. Consequently, in federative
nations the unitary system does not seem to have any prohibitive costs associated with corporate
manipulation of the formulary factors. Hence, this type of limited response may not be indicative of
what may happen if a unitary regime was to be implemented in the international arena where some
countries have significantly higher effective tax rates than those imposed by states.
30
Jack Mintz & Joann M. Weiner, Ome Open Negotiation Issues Involving a Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base in the European Union, 62 Tax L. Rev. 81 (2008)
31
It is relatively easy to observe the location of most retail transactions because the vast majority of
these transactions take place where individuals live. It is, however, important to remember that not all
retail transactions may be easy to observe. The sale of software products, for example, could be
conducted via the web anywhere. Hence it may be reasonable to say that the sale factor should not be
part of the default rule formula but only something that MNEs would be able to take into account by
undertaking an APA negotiation process.
32
Alternatively, inventories and intangibles may not be in the default rule formula but only something
that MNEs would be able to take into account by undertaking an APA negotiation process.
33
The payroll factor should be defined very broadly to guarantee that the relative costs of employment
in each jurisdiction are adequately reflected in the formula. Additionally, the cost of outsourcing
certain functions that resemble direct employment should also be taken into account, so that MNEs
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MNEs’ motivation and ability to manipulate formulary factors under a hybrid
regime are indeed a source of concern. However, a carefully delineated formulary
arrangement could reduce these concerns significantly. While the above outlined
structural features of a hybrid regime are not likely to eliminate MNEs' manipulation,
they may help constrain it so that such shifting takes place only on the margins.
The relevant point of reference to which any hybrid regime should be
compared is the current ALS-based transfer pricing regime. Hence, the hybrid system
does not have to be planning-proof, but only to perform better. As established, there
seems to be robust evidence that ALS conventions result in a lot of tax planning and
avoidance. Additionally, under a hybrid regime, tax authorities would still be able to
deploy the anti-avoidance strategies they currently use to counter aggressive tax
planning (e.g., general anti-avoidance rules and anti-avoidance judicial doctrines).
The hybrid regime would allocate income according to economic indicators
and would replace a system where tax planning is to a large extent a byproduct of
intra-MNE paper shifting. This, at least to our minds, makes it very unlikely that a
hybrid regime would underperform with respect to current international tax
arrangements.

Myth #5: Formulary Apportionment would Revoke Current International Tax
Arrangements and Require Unattainable Tax Coordination
The Myth:
U

While the current ALS-base transfer pricing regime is far from perfect,
formulary apportionment offers no alternative. Even if academics could come up with
the "correct" formulary mechanism to allocate MNE income, policymakers would
have to take into account practical considerations. First, they would have to take into
account that the ALS is already the rule of the road and is enshrined in tax treaties and
other documents such as the OECD model tax treaty and commentary. Second,
formulary arrangements require intensive cooperation to work smoothly because they
involve a lot of open questions—such as how to define the residual, how to define the
MNE group itself, and how to measure and weight the different factors.
Formulary and unitary arrangements offer a good solution for federal nations
because all states have roughly the same tax base, the same tax accounting
conventions, and mandatory dispute resolution procedures (in the form of federal
courts). These features of federative nations prevent states from using formulary
arrangements to expropriate taxes from other states. However, none of these features
exist at the international level, which means that a hybrid regime would impose a
substantial risk of tax expropriation. While most countries may be better off if they all
implement a certain hybrid formulary arrangement, it seems naïve to think that they
would be able to reach and sustain an agreement that requires intensive ongoing
coordination. Absent cooperation, countries will have the incentive to structure
expansive formulary arrangements that would lead to double taxation and impose a
heavy burden on cross-border trade and investments.

would not have the ability to reduce their tax liability by reducing the number of their direct employees
in a high-tax jurisdiction and inflating it in low-tax ones.
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The Prospect:
U

This subpart argues that policymakers can apply a hybrid formulary-ALS
arrangement without first revoking the current treaty-based international tax regime,
entering any multinational tax convention, or establishing an international tax
organization to administer it. While reforming many of the current international tax
conventions as well as increasing tax coordination among countries may entail many
advantages, an implementation of a hybrid regime does not require either. This paper
contends that a hybrid allocation regime would offer a feasible alternative to the
current transfer-pricing regime even if it is only loosely coordinated and adopted only
by some countries. To become the new rule of the road, such a regime would only
require bilateral agreements that reduce potential double taxation from conflicting
formulary systems. To establish a better MNE allocation regime, tax authorities do
not have to reach the same income-allocation figures, or to use the same methods. All
they need is to reconcile their differences by entering bilateral treaties—which is very
similar to what countries do today.
The adoption of the hybrid regime does not necessarily require revoking the
current treaty-based international tax regime. True, most treaties do require the use of
the ALS to allocate the income of related parties—subsidiaries and branches.
However, countries have recognized that ALS mechanisms are insufficient and in
many instances have moved towards mechanisms that are closer to formulary
allocation. While tax authorities that apply profit rules adhere to ALS rhetoric, they
are not confined to market alternatives and are not required to act consistently with
other tax authorities. Hence, while most countries claim they apply ALS conventions,
with respect to hard-to-tax MNE income, many of them use different (uncoordinated)
quasi-formulary methods. This gives the impression that the main objection to
formulary arrangements is title-based. Despite the contractual language of their tax
treaties, countries seem to be willing to accept arrangements that deviate from the
ALS as long as the deviation is not explicitly pronounced, is followed by other
countries, and is done under the umbrella of OECD model convention and
commentary. If these conditions would be met, it would also be possible to shift away
from ALS-rules to a hybrid regime.
An example for such a shift, which also demonstrates the OECD's role in
fostering gradual departure from ALS norms, can be seen in its recent proposal to
revise branch allocation rules. This proposal advocates allocating the income of
branches of financial institutions by the location of their significant people. 34 While
refraining from publicly denouncing its support for the ALS, this move towards
allocation seems like a major deviation towards a payroll formulary arrangement. The
OECD was correct to identify financial institutions as MNEs that require special
allocation rules 35 and has taken long-awaited necessary steps towards facilitating a
change. Although still in formulation, the OECD's branch allocation proposal
demonstrates the tremendous institutional power it has in the international tax arena,
and its ability to lead quiet revolutions in existing tax conventions and treaties through
the commentary. Like in the case of the profit-split methods, which were introduced
by the U.S. Treasury and the OECD during the 1990s, 36 the branch allocation rules
demonstrate that tax conventions have changed, are changing, and will change. If the
34 F

35F

36F
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See OECD, Report on the Transfer Pricing Aspects of Business Restructurings (July 22, 2010).
Ilan Benshalom, The Quest to Tax Financial Income in a Global Economy: Emerging to an
Allocation Phase – Taxing Global Financial Institutions, 28 Va. Tax Rev. 165 (2008)
36
Avi-Yonah, Rise and Fall, supra.
35
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problems are well identified and institutional leadership exists, important changes can
be made. Whether these changes are titled as a shift to a formulary regime is a
question of diplomacy rather than of tax policy. Hence, we conclude that a shift
towards a hybrid regime would not have to revoke current tax arrangements.
While enhanced multinational tax cooperation may be desirable, it is not a
necessary precondition for a well-functioning hybrid allocation regime. Critics of
formulary arrangement tend to exaggerate the level of tax cooperation that would be
necessary to make it effective. Obviously, the hybrid regime would operate more
smoothly and be more effective if all tax regimes apply the same (or very similar)
formulary mechanisms. If tax authorities follow the same principle arrangements, they
are likely to reach similar allocation results, which would make it easier to reconcile
their differences through bilateral negotiations. However, stating that intensive
cooperation could help improve the operation of a hybrid regime differs from the
claim that it is a prerequisite for such a regime to operate better than the one in place.
Under a hybrid regime the situation would not be very different from what it is
today. As is currently the case, most (non-haven) countries have a clear objective to
prevent the income-shifting benefits associated with the ALS-based transfer pricing
regime. However, they also have a clear objective to prevent a situation where the
international tax regime imposes significant incidents of double taxation that burdens
international trade and investment. Adding these factors together, non-haven
sovereigns have a clear incentive to embark on a two-step strategy. Step one would
involve imposing an effective (hybrid) MNE allocation regime that would prevent
income shifting. Step two would involve engaging in some type of bilateral or
multilateral treaty contractual arrangement to reduce incidents of double taxation
among them. Hence, the second step would require tax authorities to modify their
sourcing results according to the sourcing consequences of other countries' formulas.
This two-step strategy resembles how the international tax regime operates today—
through bilateral treaties with some soft-law guidance from the OECD. 37 Soft-law
mechanisms are not ideal, but they are often sufficient to allow significant changes in
international arrangements.
Reading the debate about formulary arrangements, one often gets the
impression that many commentators think that formulary arrangements require (an
almost) unanimous international agreement. However, as in the case of any
international policy, this assumption has serious negative effects—rather than seeking
unanimity, policymakers should pursue the support of a critical mass of non-haven
countries. Not all countries would be better off with a hybrid regime, and expecting
all countries to approve it is like giving veto power to those countries that benefit
from income-shifting. Put differently, it is extremely unlikely that a shift to the hybrid
regime (or any other reform in international tax conventions) could achieve Pareto
optimality. First, achieving Pareto optimality may require expensive buyouts—which
would reduce the reform's benefits. Second, it is also not clear whether Pareto
optimality is the right standard that international tax policymakers should adopt. Some
low-tax jurisdictions benefit from the current ALS-based regime by offering MNE a
convenient location to perform conduit transactions. It is not clear why the
governments of developed and developing countries should subsidize this behavior by
recognizing the tax validity of these transactions. This paper does not argue against
buyouts or against special treaty provisions that are intended to encourage countries to
37F

37

For a detailed example of a possible mutual recognition bilateral arrangement see: Ilan Benshalom,
Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational Enterprises by Employing a Formulary Arm’s Length
Allocation Mechanism, 28 Va. Tax Rev. 631 (2009).
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adopt a hybrid regime. However, these tools should be used carefully only to
accommodate the concerns of major economies—whose agreement is necessary for
the function of the hybrid regime. 38 Policymakers need to ask how much the
cooperation of a specific low-tax country is necessary for a hybrid regime to work
well, and how to best incentivize that country to align its tax policy with it.
For example, small tax havens are unlikely to join any hybrid regime
initiative, while other low-tax countries—e.g., Singapore and Ireland—are much more
likely to comply with such a regime if it is adopted by their major trading partners.
Assume a Canadian MNE that shifts its intangible assets to a Bermudian subsidiary,
so that under ALS accounting its income is reported there. However, under the hybrid
formulary-ALS regime, since most of the R&D and expenses associated with these
intangibles were recognized in Canada, the income is sourced to Canada.
Since Canada and Bermuda are unlikely to agree about how to allocate the
MNE's residual, would this result in double taxation? Perhaps, but this type of double
taxation would not disrupt international trade and therefore should not concern
(Canadian) policymakers. That the same MNE income is recognized simultaneously
in two different jurisdictions is not problematic—because the MNE income is not
effectively taxed in Bermuda. High- and medium-tax countries have incentives to
prevent double taxation only when there is real economic activity taking place.
Bermuda is a financial offshore tax haven, and Bermudian firms are typically conduits
to investments elsewhere. As a small group of islands, Bermuda has a limited ability
to attract high volumes of real economic activity, which means that its agreement to
the hybrid regime is unlikely and unnecessary.
Low-tax jurisdictions, like Ireland and Singapore, benefit from income
shifting under the current regime, but their decision about how to respond to a hybrid
regime is much more complicated. The operating principle behind the formulary
regime is that Ireland should be able to offer MNEs a low-tax rate on their activities in
Ireland, but not a tax reduction on their activities elsewhere. Ireland may try to disrupt
the establishment of a hybrid regime because it benefits from income shifting.
However, Ireland also has a clear interest to be able to use its low corporate income
tax rates to attract real investments. Hence, if Ireland's major trading partners (e.g.,
Britain, France, Germany, and the United States) adopt a (lightly coordinated) hybrid
regime, the Irish government would likely face competing incentives: to try and keep
its tax advantage as a location for income shifting, or its advantages as a location
where real businesses could be conducted with low risk of double taxation. Since
prophecy is the dominion of fools, predicting what the Irish government would decide
is not advisable. However, one could predict that it would face significant pressures to
adopt a tax regime that is compatible with the conventions of its major trading
partners.
For a hybrid regime to be operative, it is enough if a critical mass of countries
that includes some of the major developed and emerging economies accepts the need
for such a regime. A lot could be done with a far less than perfectly coordinated
38F
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In theory, all tax policies could be implemented unilaterally. However, some of the benefits
associated with shifting to formulary apportionment (e.g., lower administrative costs and more coherent
allocation of MNEs' residual income) may require some coordination among states. These "network"
benefits of coordination should be weighted against the costs of buyouts. Our point is that while the
costs of buying the cooperation of big industrialized countries such as China may be big, so would the
benefits. On the other hand, the benefits of buying the agreement of small haven countries would be
small while the costs of buying their agreements are expected to be high.
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international tax regime so that waiting for such a perfect regime, while enduring the
problems of the current regime, is both futile and costly.

Myth #6: Formulary Apportionment would Increase the Tax Rate on MNEs and
Result in a Shift of Productive Assets to Low-Tax Jurisdictions
The Myth:
U

The proposed hybrid regime would increase the effective tax rate on MNEs'
residual sources of income to which the formulary apportionment would be applied.
In an open economy, higher tax rates on mobile income are inefficient. Admittedly,
there are many limitations on MNEs' ability to shift productive assets and jobs to tax
havens such as the Cayman Islands. However, allocation by formula would likely
result in a shift of productive assets to low-tax jurisdictions such as Ireland,
Singapore, and Estonia. A hybrid regime would make it difficult for high-tax
jurisdictions to maintain mobile activities such as R&D activity and investment in
intangibles—which are key to economic growth, jobs and development. Such a
regime would therefore increase tax distortions over the efficient allocation of capital,
induce sovereigns to engage in tax competition, or raise significant opposition so that
it is politically unsustainable.
The Prospect
U

The proposal for a hybrid regime refers to the proper allocation of MNE
income. It does not have anything to do with the general effective tax rate on MNEs
or with the effective tax rate on their mobile activities. This paper concerns itself
neither with the proper tax rate that should be laid by source jurisdictions, nor with the
wisdom of imposing a source income tax on mobile activities. These questions are
political, so that they should be determined by countries in a way that satisfies their
preferences.
For example, consider a MNE like Intel that conducts manufacturing and
R&D in Israel and Germany. Israel is a country that has a very high-quality labor
force for R&D projects. Its treasury officials may therefore assign high priority to
diversifying its labor market and develop some mid-tech manufacturing facilities. On
the other hand, officials in Germany may think the country has enough mid-tech
manufacturing facilities and needs to further enhance its R&D labor market. Hence,
once Intel's income is allocated, Israel may tax the income generated by the mid-tech
manufacturing activity at low (or even negative) rates, while taxing the income
generated by the R&D activity at a different (higher) rate. Germany, of course, would
probably do exactly the opposite. The hybrid formulary-ALS allocation system does
not dictate a change in the effective tax laid on MNEs—it only changes the integrity
of the income allocation system.
This paper is concerned with the difficulty of assigning MNE income—which
is analytically separate from the question of the rate in which should it be taxed.
Governments should subsidize MNE activities which they think have positive
externalities. Subsidies can take many tax and non-tax forms—and this paper does not
address the question of how to tailor a tax subsidy to best encourage otherwise
socially underprovided commercial activities. The paper does contend, however, that
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granting a subsidy in the form of the ALS-based transfer pricing rules is wrong and
misleading.
A hybrid allocation regime would require governments to be transparent with
respect to their distributive and revenue preferences. For example, an ALS regime
allows manipulation with respect to intangibles and therefore could be seen as a
subsidy for their production. However, if a certain government believes that R&D
activity should be encouraged through tax subsidies, then there is no reason to limit
this subsidy to MNEs that can manipulate the transfer pricing regime to attain lower
taxes. If policymakers further believe that certain MNEs provide special benefits and
know-how, which merits a special tax subsidy, they should convey this message
clearly to their voters. 39 The ALS subsidy to MNEs is wasteful, because it requires
MNEs to expend resources on unproductive tax planning activities. 40 In a competitive
environment, even productive and honest MNEs would need to engage in tax shifting
manipulation.
Before concluding, a number of issues should be made clear. The question of
formulary allocation touches upon a number of unsettled issues in tax policy. There
are big question marks about whether source income taxes should be laid at all,
whether a corporate income tax is a proper fiscal instrument, and whether countries
should be concerned with the equity implications of taxing returns to capital at all
instead of directing their fiscal policy to promote higher rates of growth and
employment.
This paper's framework cannot address all these issues. Instead, it assumes that
countries' tax preferences roughly align with their tax legislation—so that a corporate
income tax is imposed as a source business-profit tax. This source tax is not
inefficient, but, like other regulatory requirements, reflects the cost of doing business
in a specific jurisdiction. MNEs should take these tax costs into account before
investing in a country—exactly in the same way that they take other costs (e.g., labor
regulation) into account. Put differently, this paper's framework does not question the
wisdom of the system currently in place and the proper composition of the tax mix. It
assumes this system reflects the preferences of voters and is concerned with how to
best manage it by providing some thoughts about how an alternative (fairer, more
transparent, and easier to comply with) MNE allocation regime could be established.
39F

40F

CONCLUSIONS
The Paper's analysis strongly suggests that adopting a hybrid formulary-ALS
regime could be a viable, practical and political option. Pursuing this option does not
require policymakers to reformulate the basic structure of the current international tax
regime. Instead, it suggests that policymakers continue the already existing trends
with respect to the hard-to-tax sources of MNE income, which involve shifting from
39

Some may find our position to be naïve in light of the real world political economy of tax policy. We
believe, however, that in a democratic regime, where the policies generated by elected representatives
should, at least in some crude way, reflect voter preferences. Hence arguing that the ALS tax-subsidy is
good because (like many other tax subsidies) it allows policymakers to hide what they are actually
doing, is not really a challenge to our position. In essence, such a view amounts to a fundamental
criticism of the democratic decision making—an issue which is (well) beyond the scope of this paper.
40
It also provides MNEs with an awkward set of incentives. Intel, for example, specializes in the
production of computer chips and it should be rewarded for its expertise by the market, and perhaps
also by governments if its functions generate positive externalities. This reward should not be
conditioned on Intel's willingness to engage in aggressive tax-shifting planning.
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the ALS towards more a formulary arrangements. It claims, however, that to better
reduce the costs of the current regime this approach should have a more concrete
sense of direction, be explicit and structured.
The table below summarizes the comparative advantages of the hybrid regime
over the current regime.
A COMPARED ANALYSIS OF THE ARTICLE’S HYBRID REGIME WITH CURRENT
TRANSFER PRICING TECHNIQUES

Precisely penetrates how MNEs derive income.
Can benefit from, but does not require, a
harmonized international corporate tax base.
Can benefit from, but does not require, a
multilateral tax agreement.
Can be promoted under an ALS title.

X

Hybrid
Formulary –
ALS Regime
X

√

√

√

√

√

√

Involves some, but not high, risks of excessive
double taxation.
Adopts ALS conventions when there are easy to
observe and consistently priced market
comparables.
Deviates from traditional ALS conventions with
respect to the hard-to-tax sources of MNE income.
Has administrative and compliance costs
associated with valuation and the need to
distinguish between different sources of income.
Allows MNEs to freely exercise their intra-group
ownership and financial structures.
Allows avoiding administrative and compliance
costs associated with the need to draft, document
and scrutinize intra MNE contractual
arrangements.
Prevents/reduces income shifting.

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

√

X

√

X

√

Provides systematic, transparent, and consistent
enforcement.

X

√

Does not reward (artificial paper shuffling) tax
planning.

X

√

X

√

X

NA
(irrelevant)

ALS Transfer
Pricing

Prevents the erosion of the corporate tax base (as a
source jurisdiction tax).
Increases effective corporate income tax rates on
MNE activities in source jurisdictions
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The above table suggests that formulary arrangements offer a real non-utopian
policy alternative and that ignoring this has prevented the advancement of the
international income tax regime. Persuaded that they are deadlocked, policymakers
and tax authorities have encumbered the tax regime with ineffective and costly ALSbased rules. However, as the analysis of this paper demonstrates, adhering to the ALS
becomes increasingly absurd as the volume and sophistication of affiliated
transactions continues to increase. Furthermore, the vulnerability of the current
transfer pricing system to the shifting of income based on intangibles ownership and
risk-bearing makes necessary numerous additional complexities in the international
tax system. For example, transfer pricing vulnerabilities probably constitute the most
pressing argument against adoption of a territorial tax system in the United States. An
effective transfer pricing reform could therefore tip the policy-making balance in
favor of adopting a territorial system, which would allow the elimination of grossly
complex foreign tax credit system for active income. The current transfer pricing
system therefore can in some respects be seen as the tail that wags the dog, which
prevents the development of a more simple, efficient, transparent and equitable
international tax regime.
Changes in the global economy require that policymakers adopt the best
method to allocate income generated by MNE activity. This paper hopefully showed
that with respect to MNEs residual income certain low cost incremental shifts from
the current regime towards more formulary arrangements could offer many benefits.
For years transfer pricing policy has been a battlefield with advocates of the
ALS and formulary apportionment sitting on each side of the barricade. This paper
contends that after decades of stagnation the barricade should be finally dismantled.
The costs of the current regime are real and growing—addressing them in an open
minded realistic way is therefore not an academic privilege but an acute necessity.
We believe that the time has come for OECD and policymakers in other major
developed and emerging economies to take the lead on exploring how new ideascan
better allocate the MNE income tax base.
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